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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TBE STERILIZATION OF THE MENTALLY
DEFICeNT-A REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE PowE?-State
v. Cavitt, 182 Neb. 713, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
The Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization (hereinafter referred to
as CES) of certain classes of individuals within our society has
been practiced in the United States since 1907. This practice is
based upon a theory of eugenics which assumes that certain types
of people are socially more desirable than others and that the
improvement of future generations can be accomplished through
decreasing the rate of propagation of the inferior individuals and
thus increasing the proportion of the desirable types. Proponents
of the principle, relying on scientific claims that certain types of
mental disabilities are inheritable traits, advocate the sterilization
of those persons possessing these traits.1
Litigation in this area has been limited, particularly after the
landmark United States Supreme Court decision in 1927 which gave
a stamp of constitutionality to CES.2 In the decisions which have
examined this area, however, one consistent factor is notable. All
statutes which have been examined by the courts have contained
a requirement that the proposed patient have an inheritable trait
towards a mental disability which would be passed to any offspring
which they might bear.
This requirement would seem in accord with the theory upon
which CES is based. Recently the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Nebraska CES statutes in State v. Cavitt.3
The Nebraska plan for the sterilization of the mentally deficient
does not require such a finding of inheritability as a prerequisite
for the operation. In sustaining this plan against Gloria Cavitt's
constitutional attack, the Nebraska Supreme Court has extended
the boundaries of the police power of the state one step beyond its
previously defined limits. At a time when statutory CES plans are
under attack as being based on a scientifically invalid premise4 i.e.
the inheritability of mental deficiency, the court has opened new
horizons for the eugenicists' dream of eliminating the unfit from
our society.
1 THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND TH LAW 183 (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961).
2 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
3 182 Neb. 713, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
4 See, e.g., Ferster, Eliminating The Unft-Is Sterilization The Answer?,
27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1966).
CASENOTE
The decision in the Cavitt case was that of a minority of the
court. This minority opinion was given effect by the Nebraska con-
stitutional provision which requires a vote of five of the seven judges
of the supreme court to declare an act of the legislature unconstitu-
tional. While such an issue raises interesting constitutional ques-
tions in itself, it is not central to the theme of this article and will
not be discussed at length here.5 It is the purpose of this note to
examine the decision in Cavitt with respect to the constitutional at-
tacks advanced and the scientific basis upon which CES schemes
rest.
STATE V. CAVITT-BACKGROUND
Gloria Cavitt is thirty-six years old and has been an inmate of
the Beatrice State Home for approximately six years. She has an
I.Q. of 71. Prior to her commitment to the State Home, she lived
with one William Cavitt for a period of fourteen years, the relation-
ship resulting in eight children. She comes from a low social and
economic brackground. Both she and the children were largely
provided for by public aid.6
5 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 provides in part that: "No legislative act shall
be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges."
The question of the constitutionality of such a provision in a state
constitution has been examined by the United States Supreme Court
in Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S.
74 (1930). In upholding the Ohio constitutional provision, the Court
relied on the Guaranty Clause of the Federal Constitution saying that
this allowed the states to structure their courts as they pleased. This
was deemed a "political question" and thus the Court would not pass
on it. It is interesting, and perhaps critical, to note here that the
merits of this case were examined and rejected as not presenting a
substantial federal question.
Although the issue has not been litigated, it would appear that
the logical grounds for an attack on such a provision would be the
Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution which states that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land: "[A]nd the Judges of
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI. The question is thus formed: Can a federally protected right
be preempted by a state constitutional provision allowing a minority
of the court to prevail? In a somewhat analogous situation, the
Supremacy Clause was used to strike down a Colorado provision for
the recall of judicial decisions. People v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1921). The basis for the decision was
that the law did not provide for the separation of state and federal
questions. Since the state could not provide for the recall of judicial
decisions holding statutes in violation of the Federal Constitution, the
recall law was void.
6 State v. Cavitt, 182 Neb. 713, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
786 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 4 (1968)
In 1967 the superintendent of the Beatrice State Home, contem-
plating Gloria's discharge, certified her to the Board of Examiners
of the Mentally Deficient under authority of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-503
(Reissue 1966). It is the duty of the Board of Examiners to investi-
gate each potential dischargee from the Beatrice State Home who
may be capable of begetting offspring and determine whether such
person should be sterilized as a condition prerequisite to his release.
7
A hearing was held with Gloria represented by appointed counsel.
The Board, at the close of the hearing, found that in their opinion
Gloria was mentally deficient, of child bearing age, and should be
sterilized prior to her release from the Home.8 Gloria appealed the
decision of the Board to the District Court for Gage County which
held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the order of the
Board and that the controlling statutes authorizing Gloria's steriliza-
tion were unconstitutional and void. From this decision, the State
appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court which reversed the lower
court decision.
Three basic constitutional arguments were used to attack the
Nebraska CES statutes: (1) that they are in violation of the due
process clause, (2) that they deny equal protection of the law, and
(3) that the practice of sterilizing the mentally deficient constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment.
DUE PROCESS
The sterilization of mental defectives has been viewed as a valid
application of the police power of the state.9 However, as Justice
Newton points out in his dissenting opinion in the Cavitt case,
there must be a reasonable relationship between the methods
which are employed by the state in its programs and the goals that
the law seeks. 10 If the relationship is vague or uncertain, the law
constitutes a violation of substantive due process guaranteed the
individual by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Buck v. Bell" has been considered by the courts of this country
as settling the question of substantive due process in the area of the
sterilization of the mentally deficient. Justice Holmes, in this case,
assumed the validity of the role of heredity in mental deficiency.
7 NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-504 (Reissue 1966).
8 Procedure for the determination is outlined in NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-505
(Reissue 1966). It was not contended that the method was procedurally
faulty.
9 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409,
204 N.W. 140 (1925).
10 182 Neb. at 726, 157 N.W.2d at 181 (dissenting opinion).
11 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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The scientific fact to Holmes that the state might, by sterilizing the
mentally deficient, reduce their numbers in subsequent generations
is sufficient justification for the assumption of the power by the
state to render such individuals sterile.1 2 Since this decision, the
scientific validity of this premise has never been questioned by an
appellate court.13
As a result of medical investigation since the implementation
of the original sterilization laws, there now exists serious doubt as
to whether the genetic principles upon which they are based are
sound. At the present time, medical and legal opinion on this point
almost universally reject the view that there is a definable rela-
tionship between heredity and mental deficiency upon which to
base such measures. The listing of those authorities rejecting or
seriously questioning this premise is long and impressive. 14 This
question also forms the basis for the dissenting opinion written by
Justice Smith in the Cavitt case.'
5
It would appear that the Nebraska Legislature has not been
entirely insensitive to the changing views of medical authority.
Until 1957, Nebraska provided CES for not only the mentally de-
ficient, but also the insane, the habitual criminal, the moral de-
generate, and the "sexual pervert." This statute also provided for
the castration of any inmate in a Nebraska institution if he was
there under conviction for "rape, incest, any crime against nature, or
violation of section 28-901."16
All classes except the mentally deficient were dropped in 1957.
No committee testimony is available as to why these sections were
deleted. While the process for the sterilization of the mentally
deficient was retained, certain changes were made in its structure.
12 See Gest, Eugenic Sterilization: Justice Holmes vs. Natural Law, 23
TEmP. L.Q. 306 (1950).
13 THE REPORT OF THE Am cAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAW 183 (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961).
14 COMIITTEE OF AMERIcAN NEUROLOGIcAL AssOcIATION, EUGENICAL STERI-
LIZATION (1936); THE REPORT OF THE AMmERICA BAR FOUNDATION, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961);
American Medical Association, The Report of the AMA Committee to
Study Contraceptive practices, PROCEEMIGS 54 (May, 1937); American
Psychiatric Association, Diamond Reports, Section III, Msc. STATUTES
(1960); Nebraska Psychiatric Association in Nebraska Legiflative
Council Report on the Mentally Retarded No. 99 at 15 (1960).
15 182 Neb. at 723, 157 N.W.2d at 179 (dissenting opinion).
16 Neb. Laws 1929, c. 163, § 4, p. 565 (repealed 1957) (now Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 83-504 (Reissue 1966)).
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By Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-504 (Reissue 1950) and in accordance with an
Attorney General's opinion,1'7 the old law required five prerequisites
to sterilization:
1. that the person is feebleminded,
2. able to beget offspring,
3. that the offspring would inherit a tendency to feeble-
mindedness,
4. that such procreation would be harmful to society,
5. that such inmate not be paroled or discharged unless
sterilized.
These requirements were replaced by Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-504 (Re-
issue 1966) which allows sterilization if:
1. the person is mentally deficient,
2. is apparently able to beget offspring,
3. in the opinion of the Board of Examiners should be steri-
lized as a condition prerequisite to parole.
The avowed purpose of this change as seen from the testimony
presented to the Public Health Committee and from the Committee's
statement on LB 518 was to broaden the base of the sterilization
practice.' The committee's statement on LB 518 notes: "This bill
would permit an individual to leave the institution and take care of
himself, but not burden society with children."'19
Evidently Justice Carter in the Cavitt case has adopted this
view of the state's power to sterilize the mentally deficient although
his position is somewhat unclear. He states: "[T]he state may limit
a class of citizens in its right to bear or beget children with an in-
17 221 Att. Gen. Reports 379 (1958).
18 Dr. E. L. Spradling, then superintendent of the Lincoln State Hospital,
testified that the five prerequisites practically eliminated sterilization
practices as all five conditions were rarely found in one person. It
will be noted here that what he was saying was that since the person
must be feeble-minded and of child bearing age to even be considered
for sterilization and requirement "5" is of only a general nature, the
requirement of a finding of a hereditary trait toward mental deficiency
in an individual had practically eliminated the practice. Hearings be-
fore the Public Health Committee, 1957 Legislature, LB 518 (1958).
19 Hearings before the Public Health Committee, 1957 Legislature, LB
518 (1958).
20 182 Neb. at 715, 157 N.W.2d at 175.
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herited tendency to mental deficiency 2 .... " Then: "It is the func-
tion of the Legislature, and its duty as well, to enact appropriate
legislation to protect the public and preserve the race from the
known effects of the procreation of mentally deficient children by
the mentally deficient."21 Both of these statements seem to indicate
that the court feels heredity is the prime factor in these laws. How-
ever, Justice Carter continues: "It is apparent here that the Board
could order the sterilization of a patient who had suffered mental
deficiency from an accident or disease, or some other form of mental
deficiency entirely unrelated to the transmission to offspring of a
tendency to mental deficiency."22 He notes: "They [sterilization
laws] have been applied to mental defective where transmission
of mental weakness is not possible."23 Finally the court says: "The
effect of mental deficiency upon the patient, children born to him,
the community, and the general welfare ... are pertinent considera-
tions in the area of sterilization."
24
The court apparently arrives at this standard: If you are
mentally deficient but emotionally stable and financially able to
support children, you will escape the sterilizer's knife. If not, you
must be sterilized as a prerequisite to release from the Beatrice
State Home. This position is, in fact, the social cost theory advanced
by the early eugenicists that even a normal child born to abnormal
parents will probably become a burden on society by adding to
its welfare roles.25 This view is coming back into vogue now that
the heredity factor has been seriously questioned by medical
authorities.
21 182 Neb. at 715, 157 N.W.2d at 175. This language is verbatim from the
1925 Michigan case of Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140
(1925) where the Michigan Court upheld the state sterilization law
which was based upon the heredity factor.
22 182 Neb. at 716, 157 N.W.2d at 175.
23 182 Neb. at 716, 157 N.W.2d at 175. It would have been helpful here if
the court would have cited instances where this was done. Justice
Newton, in his dissenting opinion, states: "It may be noted that in the
great majority of cases, and perhaps without exception, where other
jurisdictions have held sterilization statutes to be constitutional, the
thinking of the legislature [i.e. the inclusion of a heredity factor] was
incorporated in the statute in the same manner as it may be found in
the old Nebraska act now repealed." State v. Cavitt, 182 Neb. 713,
728, 157 N.W.2d 171, 181 (1968) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
24 182 Neb. at 720, 157 N.W.2d at 177.
25 At this point, one wonders what effect the fact that Gloria Cavitt had
eight children largely provided for by public aid had on the Board of
Examiners and the court and, also, whether they were in fact sterilizing
an ADC mother as opposed to a mentally deficient person.
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The Nebraska CES law as interpreted by the supreme court
would appear open to attack on two grounds relating to the require-
ment of substantive due process to be met in this type of govern-
mental action. The question first arises as to the existence of
guidelines as limitations on the exercise of this power by the Board
of Examiners. It is axiomatic that delegations of power to ad-
ministrative boards must be accompanied by such safeguards against
the arbitrary exercise of the discretion vested in them. As Justice
Carter observed in an earlier opinion devoted to this issue: "The
limitations of the power granted and the standards by which the
powers are to be administered must, however, be clearly and
definitely stated in the authorizing act."26 Justice Newton, in his
dissenting opinion in the Cavitt case has developed the question
of such power delegations at length.
2 7
There are three requirements in the Nebraska CES law which
could ostensibly be called standards to be met in each individual
sterilization case. The person must be mentally deficient and of child
bearing age. These would appear to be truisms as opposed to
standards assuming that those committed to the Beatrice State
Home are, indeed, mentally deficient and realizing the futility of
sterilizing those who are not of child bearing age. The final requisite
is that in the opinion of the Board the person should be sterilized
as a condition prerequisite to release. In other words, the decision
as to the potential social undesirability of offspring is left entirely in
the hands of the administrators. Commenting on this fact, Justice
Newton noted: "[T]he statute fails to make clear in what manner,
if any, the Legislature now considers procreation by a feeble-minded
person to be detrimental to society and it clearly does not require
the finding of any facts whatsoever that point in that direction.
'28
The court has apparently attempted to fill the legislative gap
in this area by suggesting several general guidelines for considera-
tion by the Board. Not wishing to develop at length the issue of
judicially suppplied standards, for the purpose of this Note it is
sufficient to consider the comments of the United State Supreme
Court in this area:
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the
Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges
and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what
is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.
29
26 Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 783, 104 N.W.2d 227, 231
(1960).
27 182 Neb. at 726, 157 N.W.2d at 181 (dissenting opinion).
28 Id. at 728, 157 N.W.2d at 181 (dissenting opinion).
29 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
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Turning to the second problem area under the due process
clause, the question might be asked as to whether the state, acting
under its police power, has the power to sterilize an individual
showing no inheritable trait towards mental deficiency because he
might not be able to psychologically or financially support normal
children born to him? The Nebraska Supreme Court answers this
question in the affirmative. While Buck v. Bell seemingly foreclosed
the discussion of the legitimacy of police power exercised in this
area, it must be remembered that Justice Holmes based his decision
on the inheritability of mental deficiency. To the extent that this
premise has been proven false, the power of the state to move in
this way has been compromised.
While realizing that men in a free society are sometimes re-
quired to relinquish certain rights for the benefit of the common
welfare, it is submitted that speculation as to whether potential off-
spring might be socially undesirable is not a valid basis upon whch
the state may destroy the bodily integrity of its citizens. The exer-
cise of the police power by the state is not unlimited.
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed [by the due process clause], the term has
received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring
up children,... The established doctrine is that this liberty may
not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reason-
able relation to some purpose within the competency of the State
to effect.30
EQUAL PROTECTION
Another avenue for attack on sterilization statutes has been
that they represent a denial of equal protection of the law.3 ' This
argument was successfully advanced in the early years of steriliza-
tion litigation. It was held that application of such laws to inmates
of state institutions and not those living within the community con-
stituted such denial.3 2 However, Justice Holmes in the Buck case
seemingly answered this argument saying that equal protection is
satisfied by the fact that "the law does all that is needed when it
80 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32 Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Osborn v.
Thompson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (3d Dep't 1918); Smith
v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913).
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does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the
lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so
far and so fast as its means allow. 3 Equal protection arguments
on this basis have been rejected in all cases on point after Holmes'
statement.3 4
Nebraska CES laws apply only to the Beatrice State Home. The
court in the Cavitt case observed that if the plan of the legislature
is changed to add a second institution for the care of the mentally
deficient, it would be necessary to change the classification of those
institutions to which sterilization statutes apply in order to avoid a
denial of equal protection of the law as class legislation. The court
reasoned that as Beatrice was the only institution authorized to
accept mentally deficient persons, there was no denial of equal
protection.
Justice Carter's argument, however, is based on a false premise.
Under existing Nebraska law, mentally deficient persons may be
committed to any state institution either at the discretion of the
committing judge,3 5 or at the discretion of the Department of In-
stitutions. 86 Considering the dicta of the court, it would seem that
these provisions would violate equal protection warnings. This is
particularly true if the persons restrained in other institutions are
released without being subject to sterilization hearings.
It will be noted that Justice Holmes' statement in the Buck case
has not entirely foreclosed the area of sterilization with respect to
equal protection arguments. Commenting generally on the equal
protection clause recently, the United States Supreme Court said:
[T]he equal protection clause is not shackled to the political theory
of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historical notions
of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed
33 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
34 Note, Sixty years of compulsory sterilization, "three generations of
imbeciles", and the Constitution of the United States, 43 Csn.-KENT L.
REv. 123 (1966). Not all are in accord with this view, however. As
the Committee of the American Neurological Association points out
concerning laws applicable to state institutions: "The laws are dis-
criminatory..., it is simple justice to state if legislation is necessary,
[deferring judgment as to the need for sterilization laws] then it
should be applied to individuals confined in private institutions and
whenever possible to individuals who are not in hospitals at all"
CoIVnITTE OF THE AmIVmcAxu NEUROLOGIcAL AssocIATioN, EUGENICAL
STERnZATiON 21 (1936).
35 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-223 (Reissue 1966).
36 NEB. Ray. STAT. § 83-109 (Reissue 1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-227 (Re-
issue 1966).
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catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
individual rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the equal protection clause do change.3 7
Keeping this comment in mind, a much more serious argument
arises from the court's decision in the Cavitt case. Smith v. Com-
mand,38 cited by the court in support of its decision, held that those
mentally deficient constituted a valid class upon which sterilization
could be practiced. In this case, however, the Michigan court struck
down as a denial of equal protection a provision of the Michigan
statute presented to them which provided that the feeble-minded
who would be unable to financially support their children (placing
the burden on the state) should be sterilized. The court found this
to be a violation of the equal protection clause, creating a subclass
within a class, thus allowing the rich who could support their
children to escape the law.
In the Cavitt case the Nebraska Supreme Court has also created
a subclass within the class of the mentally deficient. As mentioned,
not all mentally deficient are subject to sterilization, only those who
may be unfit parents thus placing the burden of raising their chil-
dren on the state.
Carrying the argument one step further, the drawing of a classi-
fication on this basis would indeed seem to approach the "invidious
discrimination" test applied by the United States Supreme Court.39
Distinctions between the mentally deficient with respect to the
burden on society of caring for their children and other classes,
such as ADC mothers, for example, would seem tenuous at best.
From the above it can be seen that if the present Nebraska
statute is to be based on the detrimental effect to society of normal
children born to mentally deficient parents rather than the produc-
tion of mentally deficient children by the mentally deficient, new
equal protection arguments can be advanced.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Sterilization statutes have from time to time been attacked on
the grounds that they are in violation of the Eighth Amendment
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments.4 0 These attacks
have been successful only where the statute applied to those con-
37 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
38 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
39 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
40 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
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victed of a crime.41 In In re Clayton,42 the Nebraska Supreme Court
found that the sterilization of a mental defective by the operation of
vasectomy (male) or salpingectomy (female) was not cruel and un-
usual punishment. The court clearly limited its holding to the facts
as presented by the case. In accompanying dicta, it indicated that
the application of such sterilization procedures to any person outside
of this class would violate the Eighth Amendment. At that time, the
Nebraska statute applied to habitual criminals. One authority has
concluded from his research that no appellate court has ever held
that the sterilization of a defective was in violation of the Eighth
Amendment unless he was also a convicted felon.
43
In line with the Clayton decision and its affirmation by the court
in the Cavitt case, it should be noted that the Nebraska statutes do
not provide for the type of operation to be used in the sterilization.
Both courts assume salpingectomy and vasectomy will be used. But,
in fact, this decision is left to the Board of Examiners to order that
type of operation which would be most appropriate to each given
case. Apparently catching this oversight, the court in the supple-
mental opinion written upon the denial of a motion for rehearing
notes: "We would interpret the statute to require the simplest pro-
cedure possible to effect sterilization." 44 Vetoing a sterilization bill
presented to him in 1907, the Governor of Illinois returned the bill
with this message:
The nature of the operation is not described but it is such opera-
tion as they shall decide to be the safest and most effective. It is
plain that the safest and most effective methods of preventing
procreation would be to cut off the heads of the inmates .. 5
While it is difficult to relate the word punishment as used in the
Eighth Amendment and CES laws generally, it is well to remember
that we have here an invasion of the individual's body while he is
under restraint by the state. Commenting on the use of the blood
test in Driving While Intoxicated investigations, the United States
Supreme Court has said: "The integrity of an individual's body is a
cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Consti-
tution does not forbid minor intrusions into the individual's body
4' Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
42 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931).
43 Note, Sixty years of compulsory sterilization, "three generations of
imbeciles," and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI.-KENT L.
Rv. 123, 128 (1966).
44 183 Neb. 243, 245, - N.W.2d -, -, (1968).
45 Vetoes by the Governor of Bills Passed by the Legislature, Session of
1905, 26. Cited in THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FouNDATrON, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 184 (1961).
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under stringently limited conditions, in no way indicates that it
permits more substantial intrusions."46
For some reason the Nebraska Supreme Court has attempted to
characterize the operation to be performed as voluntary. Remaining
in the Beatrice State Home makes the statute inapplicable. Gloria
Cavitt may now choose between being sterilized and remaining in
the Home the rest of her life. Justice Carter observes that: "[T]he
right of a woman to bear... children is a natural and constitutional
right .... "7 The situation he proposes, then, is the waiver of a
natural and constitutional right as a condition of freedom. As
Justice Smith points out in his dissenting opinion, "[T]he coercive
feature is hardly masked by the fictive option of sterilization or life
imprisonment,"48 But Justice Spencer, in the supplemental opinion
concludes: "The choice is hers '49
In the Cavitt case, the court says that sterilization is in no sense
a punishment for a crime. If, however, one accepts the prevailing
theory that the inheritability quality of mental deficiency is too
uncertain to use as a basis for sterilization, and would subscribe to
the theory that even normal children born to abnormal parents will
be a burden on the state, another argument arises under the Eighth
Amendment. In Robinson v. California,0 the United States Supreme
Court found an Eighth Amendment violation in the imprisonment of
a drug addict. The fact that the drug addict may be a potential
threat to the state does not give it the right to restrain him.
May a state then sterilize a mentally deficient person on the
basis that any potential offspring might become a burden upon
society? Or, as one commentator put it, because the mentally defici-
ent person is considered to be an antisocial threat, he is forced to
surrender a more basic right than the ninety days California at-
tempted to take fro mthe drug addict.51
CONCLUSION
Justice William 0. Douglas, speaking in a sterilization case
before the Supreme Court observed:
We are faced with legislation [the sterilization of habitual
criminals] which involves one of the basic rights of man. Marriage
40 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
47 182 Neb. at 715, 157 N.W.2d at 175.
48 182 Neb. at 723, 157 N.W.2d at 179.
49 183 Neb. at 247, - N.W.2d at - (Court's emphasis).
60 370 U.S. 660 (1964).
51 McWilliams, "Cruet and Unusual Punishments": Use and Misuse of
the Eighth Amendment, 53 A.B.A.J. 451 (1967).
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and procreation are fundamental to the very existence of the race.
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races
of types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the
law touches. Any experiment the state conducts is to his irrepar-
able injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.52
Aside, then, from the legal and moral issues raised by the issue
of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization, this power in the hands of a
legislature as a tool for "purifying the race" or "eliminating the
unfit" could result in frightening consequences. At the risk of over-
stating the possible results of such a program, an example from
recent history would serve to illustrate this point. Albert Deutsch,
in a book written in 1936,53 notes the application of sterilization laws
in Nazi Germany. Originally feeble-mindeds were to be sterilized.
At the writing of the book, nine various vaguely-defined categories
were subject to the law including the "slightly feeble-minded". In
an ominous forewarning of what was to come, Nazi officials were
already referring to enemies of the coordinated state as per se
feeble-minded while the government was studying the possibility of
the sterilization of certain religious and racial "non-Aryan" groups.
The escalation of such programs into the final solution is well
documented.
The effect of the court's decision in the Cavitt case is to extend
the police power of the state to new limits. Careful consideration
should be given by the legislature in any attempt to fulfill the
court's mandate. Artificially structured societies can leave much
to be desired.
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
which should provide: "That the wives of our guardians be held in
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child
his parent... The proper officers will take the offspring of the good
parents to the pen or fold and there they will deposit them with
certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of
the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will
be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should
be."54
Or better that they are never born?
Larry L. Langdale '69
52 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1943).
53 A. DEUTScH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 375 (1936).
54 Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1922) (emphasis added).
